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The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499-494 BC. Darius swore revenge on these two city-states, and also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of Ancient Greece.⁴ A preliminary expedition under Mardonius, in 492 BC, to secure the land approaches to Greece ended with the re-conquest of Thrace and forced Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia.⁵

In 491 BC, Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states, asking for a gift of 'earth and water' in token of their submission to him.⁶ Having had a demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of Greek cities duly obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on trial and then executed; in Sparta, they were simply thrown down a well.⁶ This meant that Sparta was also now effectively at war with Persia.⁶

Darius thus put together an amphibious task force under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 BC, which attacked Naxos, before receiving the submission of the other Cycladic Islands. The task force then moved on Eretria, which it besieged and destroyed.⁷ Finally, it moved to attack Athens, landing at the bay of Marathon, where it was met by a heavily outnumbered Athenian army. At the ensuing Battle of Marathon, the Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia.⁸

Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition.⁴ Darius then died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly re-started the preparations for the invasion of Greece. Since this was to be a full scale invasion, it required long-term planning, stock-piling and conscription. Xerxes decided that the Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (rounding which headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492 BC). These were both feats of exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any contemporary state.⁹ By early 480 BC, the preparations were complete, and the army which Xerxes had mustered at Sardis marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges.¹⁰

The Athenians had also been preparing for war with the Persians since the mid-480s BC, and in 482 BC the decision was taken, under the guidance of the Athenian politician Themistocles, to build a massive fleet of triremes that would be necessary for the Greeks to fight the Persians⁴. However, the Athenians did not have the manpower to fight on land and sea; and therefore combatting the Persians would require an alliance of Greek city states. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water, but making the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta.¹¹ Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC,¹² and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other.⁴

The 'Allies' initially adopted a strategy of blocking the land and sea approaches to southern Greece.¹³ Thus, in August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes's approach, a small Allied army led by the Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the Pass of Thermopylae, whilst an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium. Famously, the massively outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persians army for six days in total, before being outflanked by a mountain path. Although much of the Greek army retreated, the rearguard of Spartans and Thespians were surrounded and killed.⁴ The simultaneous Battle of Artemisium was up to that point a stalemate;¹⁴ however, when news of Thermopylae reached them, they also retreated, since holding the straits of Artemisium was now a moot point.¹⁵

The Allied fleet had then sailed from Artemisium to Salamis to assist with the final evacuation of Athens, whilst the mostly Peloponnesian Allied army prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth.¹⁶ Following Thermopylae, the Persian army had proceeded to burn and sack the Boeotian cities which had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae; before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. Xerxes wished for a final crushing defeat of the Allies to finish the conquest of Greece in that campaigning season; conversely the Allies sought a decisive victory over the Persian navy that would guarantee the security of the Peloponnessus.¹⁷ The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Greeks, marking (in retrospect) a turning point in the conflict.¹⁸

Following the defeat of his navy at the Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with the bulk of the army. He left Mardonius, with handpicked troops, to complete the conquest of Greece the following year.¹⁹ Mardonius evacuated Attica, and over-wintered in Thessaly;²⁰ with the Athenians then reoccupying their destroyed city.¹⁸ Over the winter, there seems to have been some tension between the Allies. In particular, the Athenians, who were not protected by the Isthmus, but whose fleet were the key to the security of the Peloponnesus, felt hard done by, and demanded an Allied army march north the following year.¹⁸ When the Allies failed to commit to this, the Athenian fleet refused to join the Allied navy in Spring. The navy, now under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides, thus skulked off Delos, whilst the remnants of the Persian fleet skulked off Samos, both sides unwilling to risk battle.²¹ Similarly, Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was pointless, whilst the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponessus.¹⁸

Mardonius moved to break the stalemate, by offering peace, self-government and territorial expansion to the Athenians (with the aim of removing their fleet from the Allied forces), using Alexander I of Macedon) as intermediate.²¹ The Athenians made sure that a Spartan delegation was on hand to hear the offer, but rejected it:

Athens was thus evacuated again, and the Persians marched south and re-took possession of it. Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis. Athens, along with Megara and Plataea sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance, and threatening to accept the Persian terms if not.²² According to Herodotus, the Spartans, who were at that time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus, delayed making a decision until they were persuaded by a guest, Chileos of Tegea, who pointed out the danger to all of Greece if the Athenians surrendered.²³ When, the next day the Athenian emissaries delivered an ultimatum to the Spartans, they were amazed to hear that a task force was in fact already en route; the Spartan army was marching to meet the Persians.²⁴

Prelude

When Mardonius learned of the Spartan force, he completed the destruction of Athens, tearing down whatever was standing and covering it with soil. He then retreated to Thebes, hoping to lure the Greek army there²⁵.

Mardonius fortified the Asopus river in Boeotia, hoping that the Greeks would be unable to unite against him. However, the Athenians sent 8,000 men and marched with the Spartan force to the pass over Mount Cithaeron, where they could successfully defend themselves from Persian raids. Mardonius sent cavalry charges led by Masistius to attack the Greeks, hoping to lure them onto the plain or to check whether his cavalry could successfully attack a phalanx on hilly terrain.²⁶ Masistius met resistance from the Megarans and Athenians under the command of Olympiodorus, in the centre of the Greek formation. Masistius was killed and his cavalry retreated. The Greeks began to move away from the pass towards the plain of Plataea where Mardonius had built a fortified camp, and where the Greek hoplites could fight more easily. The Athenians formed the left wing of the army, with the Spartans on the right and the Tegeans in the center.

The opposing forces

The Greeks

According to Herodotus, the Spartans sent 45,000 men under the command of Pausanias: 5,000 Spartiates (full citizen soldiers), 5,000 Perioikoi and 35,000 helots; the largest single Spartan fighting force ever to appear in battle. The Greek army was reinforced by contigents from the other Allied city-states, giving them a total strength of 110,000 men;²⁷ 38,700 hoplites and 71,300 light troops. The hoplites came from the following city-states:

Of the light troops, 35,000 were the aforementioned helots, 1,800 were Thespians and the other 34,500 are simply said to be from the other cities, about one per hoplite. The number of helots is disputed because it implies seven helots for every Spartan. Some historians have accepted these numbers and used them as a population census of Greece at the time. Others have claimed that the numbers are bloated. The battle near Mycale is supposed to have taken place at the same time, accounting for at least 25,000 men (mostly Athenians but also many Spartans) on the Asian front, which means the Greek coalition could have numbered around 80,000 men. Other historians have rejected the idea that there were any light troops at all, only hoplites. Considering that Pausanias tried to bring political reform to Sparta by giving the helots some rights, it is more likely than not that he had seen them in battle. Furthermore, if the whole Spartan hoplite force had indeed been sent to Plataea, it would have been risky to have left such large numbers of able-bodied helots at home; therefore having them present at the battle as auxiliary troops would have arguably been the more prudent choice.

The Persians

Mardonius, on the other hand, according to Herodotus, had 300,000 Persians, of which 50,000 under Artabazus did not take part in the battle because their leader disagreed with Mardonius' tactics. Ctesias who wrote in the 4th century BC a history of Persia based on Persian archives, claimed 120,000 Persian and 7,000 Greek soldiers, but placed the battle before Salamis. This discrepancy is probably due to the fact that his work did not survive and what is known of it is a fragment in the Myriobiblos, which was compiled by the Ecumenical Patriarch Photius in the 9th century AD.

The figure of 300,000 has been doubted by several modern historians, who have given figures as low as 50,000, beginning with Ctesias' number [13] [14] [15] [16] [17]. JAR Munro and Macan ²⁹ note that Herodotus mentions by name six superior military commanders and 29 μυριαρχοι (muriarchoi), that is commanders of a baivarabam. The baivarabam was the tactical unit of the ancient Persian infantry that numbered 10,000 men.³⁰ While it is possible that Xerxes, on leaving Greece after the battle of Salamis accompanied by probably 60,000 troops,³¹ did leave his formations undermanned, it would have been unwise to leave a small force since he knew that Persian archers could defeat hoplites only with superior numbers. Also, Mardonius did have a force of allied Greeks - all Greek states north of Athens - especially the ever-"medizing" (i.e. allied to the "Medes") Thebans and allies from Thessalia. Ancient sources say they numbered perhaps 50,000, and while this may seem exaggerated, the northern states were certainly able to field 30,000 hoplites. British historian N.G.L. Hammond accepts that there were 300,000 Persians at Plataea, though he claims that the invasion force that was gathered in Doriskos one year earlier was smaller.

The Battle

The Greek formation, according to Herodotus, was arrayed in the following order (from right to left): The Lacedaemonians and Spartans, Tegeans, Corinthians, Potidaeans, Troezenians, Lepreats, Mycenians and Tirynthians, Phleiasians, Hermionians, Eretrians and Styrians, Chalcidians, Ambraciots, Leucadians and Anactorians, Palees from Cephallenia, Aeginetans, Megarians, Plataeans and Athenians.

The Persian formation pitted the Persians against the Spartans and Tegeans, Medes against Corinthians, Potideans, Orchomenians and Sicyonians, Bactrians against Epidaurians, Troezenians, Lepreats, Tirynthians, Mycenians and Floiasians, Indians against Hermionians, Eretrians, Styrians and Chalcideans, Scythians against Ambraciotians, Anactorians, Leucadians, Palians and Aeginians, the Greek allies of the Persians against Plateans and Athenians. There were however other forces in the Persian camp: Frygians, Mysians, Thracians, Paonians, Ethiopians and Egyptians who were only lightly armed (if at all).

Both armies camped in front of each other for 10 days with the Greek force repeatedly attacked by the Persian cavalry, one such skirmish by the Persian cavalry against Greek lines saw the death of the Persian cavalry officer Masistius, greatly raising the morale of the Greeks³². However, with no sign of either side beginning the battle due to unfavourable omens on both sides ³³ the Persians forced the Greeks hand by fouling the Greek water supply and capturing a convoy with 500 oxen, so the Greeks were forced to find a new camp. Finally Mardonius, after a council where Artabazus suggested retreating to Thebes where they had many supplies, decided to attack. According to traditional accounts, during the night, King Alexander I of Macedon crossed the Asopus river, and appeared before the Athenian generals (Aristides only according to Plutarch) and said the following:

Thus knowing the long awaited battle was now at hand, the Greeks made their plans accordingly. Owing to previous Athenian experience in fighting Persians at the battle of Marathon, the Athenians and Spartans switched positions so that the Athenians would defend against the main Persian force while the Spartans would fight the Greek subjects within the Persian army. Seeing this, Mardonius, delighted at the apparent cowardice of the fabled Spartan army, switched his formation too. Then, on the 12th night from founding the second camp and owing to lack of water and provisions, the Greeks decided to move. This was done with some confusion.

On discovering the Greeks had abandoned their positions, Mardonius, now doubly convinced of Spartan cowardice and of his correct judgement in deciding to fight them here and now, chased after them. Seeing that the Greek formation was divided in three and judging them to be in flight, he decided to attack, without realising he was sending his force into a trap. The Persian cavalry and archers first came upon the Spartans who were still moving, and the infantry arrived soon after. The Spartans retreated higher in the mountains where they were protected from cavalry attacks. The cavalry and archers did little damage and withdrew when the infantry arrived. The Spartans asked the Athenians for help, but they were unable to send any because they were being attacked by the Thebans.

The numerically superior Persian infantry were of the heavy (by Persian standards) sparabara formation that was still much lighter than the Greek phalanx. The Persian defensive weapon was a large wicker shield, compared to the heavy bronze shield of the phalanx. The Persians formed a shield wall and started firing volleys of arrows against the Spartans and the Tegeans. After suffering these volleys for some time, the Tegeans attacked, forcing the Spartans to follow suit. The Greek long spears gave them a tactical advantage over the Persian short spears and swords, and the battle soon turned into a slaughter. The Persians were annihilated; Mardonius himself was killed by a Spartan named Aeimnestus. In the meantime, while the Spartans were still suffering from the arrows, the Athenians moved to help them, but found themselves facing the Persians' Greek allies. While most Greeks feigned cowardice, the Thebans attacked and fought bravely, being repelled with 300 casualties. Herodotus claims that the rest of the Greek and Persian forces did not fight, something very dubious. Unfortunately, no other ancient source with a full description of the battle has survived to say otherwise.

The Persian Artabazus, who had unsuccessfully tried to convince Mardonius to avoid a pitched battle, then took command and immediately retreated, allowing the Greeks to capture their camp. According to Herodotus, only 43,000 Persians survived the battle, while the Greeks as a whole lost only 159 men. Furthermore, he claims that only Spartans, Tegeans and Athenians died, since they were the only ones who fought. Plutarch, who had access to other sources, gives 1,360 Greek casualties, while both Ephorus and Diodorus tally the Greek casualties to over 10,000. However, historical records of the period are notoriously biased or inaccurate and the real number of casualties will never truly be known. Use of any of the ancient casualty figures places Plataea in the list of the most lethal battles in world history, and it may have been more lethal than any preceding battle.

Aftermath

According to tradition, the Battle of Mycale occurred on the same day, with the Greek fleet destroying the Persian fleet in the Aegean Sea off the coast of Ionia. The Persian army, under the command of Artabazus tried to retreat all the way back to Asia Minor. Most of the 43,000 survivors were attacked and killed by the forces of Alexander I of Macedon at the estuary of the Strymon river. This ended the defensive phase of the Persian War, although the Persians continued to interfere in Greek politics until they were conquered in the 4th century BC by Alexander the Great. However, this was the last time the Persians tried to invade the Greek mainland with the goal of total conquest.

A bronze column in the shape of intertwined snakes (Serpent column) was created from the melted-down Persian weapons acquired in the battle plunder of the Persian camp and was offered at the oracle of Delphi, which commemorated all the Greek city-states who participated in the battle. Part of it still survives in the Hippodrome of Constantinople in present-day Istanbul, where it was carried by Constantine the Great during the founding of his city on the Greek colony of Byzantium. It lists all city-states that took part in the battle, confirming Herodotus' account (but not his numbers). The Greeks also took Mardonius' payroll money and other treasure. The Greeks are recorded to have marvelled at the splendour of the Persian camp, asking why being so wealthy, the Persians wanted to conquer their relatively poor peninsula.

Another important and longer-lasting aftermath was that after the Persian wars the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries. Eventually, especially after the March of the 10,000, their superior fighting ability (due to their armor and battle tactics) was demonstrated, leading the way for Alexander the Great's conquests.

Some accounts of individuals

Significance

Legacy

References

^ Peter Green, Xerxes at Salamis, 1970.
^ Tom Holland, Persian Fire, 2006. ISBN: 0385513119.
^ Julius Beloch, The Greco-Persian Wars.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Persian Fire. Holland, T. Abacus, ISBN 978-0-349-11717-1
^ Herodotus VI, 44 [1]
^ ^a ^b ^c Hollan, pp178-179
^ Herodotus VI, 101 [2]
^ Herodotus, VI, 113 [3]
^ Holland, pp213-214
^ Herodotus VII, 35 [4]
^ Herodotus VII, 31 VII, 32
^ Herodotus VII, 145 [5]
^ Holland, pp255-257
^ Herodotus VIII, 18 [6]
^ Herodotus, VIII, 21 [7]
^ Herodotus VIII, 71 [8]
^ Holland, p303
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Holland, p333-335
^ Holland, pp327-329
^ Holland, p330
^ ^a ^b ^c Holland, pp336-338
^ Herodotus IX, 7 [9]
^ Herodotus IX, 6-9 [10]
^ Herodotus IX, 10 [11]
^ Herodotus 9, 1-18
^ Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους (History of the Greek nation) vol. Β', Ekdotiki Athinon, Athens 1972
^ Herodotus IX, 30 9.30
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^o ^p ^q ^r ^s ^t ^u ^v ^w Herodotus IX, 28 [12]
^ Cambridge Ancient History vol IV 1929
^ Papademetriou Konstantinos Περσικό Πεζικό: Η δύναμη που κατέκτησε τη νοτιοδυτική Ασία (Persian Infantry: The force that conquered southwest Asia), Panzer magazine, issue 22 September-October 2005 Athens, Periscopio edition
^ Garoufalis Demetrius Η ναυμαχία της Σαλαμίνας : Η σύγκρουση που άλλαξε την ιστορία (=The battle of Salamis, the clash that changed history, Στρατιωτική Ιστορία (=Military History) Magazine, issue 24 August 1998, Athens
^ Herodotus, The Histories, BK 9
^ Herodotus, The Histories, Bk, 9, 36
^ Herodotus 9,45
^ Herodotus 9,72
^ Frank Miller (comics)

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